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extremely few, who have fallen foul of the law and this may per-
haps on the whole have appeared to you a little dismal. But it is 
the dark side of things that brings out more fully the brighter side 
and the medical profession in Malta has indeed a very bright re-
cord. After you have heard all this, I should no.t like any of you to 
look upon the law with even the slightest degree of unfriendliness, 
for may I conclude by saying - and I firmly believe this - that the 
law is indeed the best friend of an honest man. 
DOES 'LEGAL RELATIONSHIP' CONSTITUTE 
AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE IN MALTA? 
A. DEPASQUALE 
1. NOTION OF 'LEGAL RELATIONSHIP'. 
By 'Legal Relationship' we are here understanding specifically 
that special relationship in law that arises between an adopter and 
the person adopted by him in any way which, according to the laws 
of the country, constitutes a true legal adoption. This special re-
lationship lies in the fact that, once legal adoption has truly taken 
place to the full satisfaction of the law, in the eyes of the law in 
most respects and almost as a general rule the adopted child as-
sumes the same relationship to the adopter (or adopting spouses) 
as any child born in lawful marriage bears to his parents. 
2. 'LEGAL RELATIONSHIP' IN THE LAW OF MALTA REGARDING MARRIAG-
ES. 
The Civil Code of Malta, while regulating the rights and duties 
arising from validly contracted Marriage together with such other 
civil effects as filiation and parent.al authority does not say how 
Marriage is to be validly celebrated in Malta. It fails to make any 
provisions either about the formalities required in its celebration 
or about the essential requisites on the part of the spouses con-
tracting Marriage that could affect its validity. 
It is, however, the constant doctrine and practice of our Civil 
Courts to require that marriages celebrated in Malta between par- · 
ties of whom at least one is a member of the Catholic <;burch be 
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celebrated according to the form laid down by Canon Law and that 
such marriages be regulated also as regards 'essentials' by the 
Canon Law of the Catholic Church then applying. Among these 
'essentials' one finds the juridical capability of both parties of 
contracting Marriage according to the law. This capability does not 
exist wherever a 'canonical impediment' to Marriage comes bet-
ween the parties. This occurs when there is any circumstance 
which, according to Canon Law, affects the juridical capability of 
the parties to contract Marriage either by making it simply unlaw-
ful for them to contract it ('simply prohibitive impediments') or ev-
en by rendering them incapable of marrying validly ( 'diriment impe-
diments'). 
Our Civil Code lays down no impediments to Marriage when 
dealing with marriage itself. Yet in view of what we have just said 
we must conclude that even in Civil Law marriages celebrated in 
Malta between parties of whom at least one is a member of the Ca-
tholic Church are unlawful if affected by a canonical impediment 
which is simply prohibitive, and altogether invalid if affected by 
such an impediment that is diriment. The whole question, therefore, 
seems to boil down to this: Does present-day Canon Law of the 
Catholic Church include 'legal relationship' among either the pro-
hibitive or the diriment canonical impediments? 
3. 'LEGAL RELATIONSHIP' IN CANON LAW REGARDING MARRIAGES. 
This question brings us face to face with a somewhat embaras-
sing situation in Malta. As we have seen, civil society in Malta by 
custom -refers us to Canon Law in all that regards the essentials 
and formalities of marriage of members of the Catholic Church in 
Malta. Canon Law, on the other hand, refers us back tp Civil Law 
of each State when speaking of 'legal relationship' as an impedi-
ment to marriage. In fact, canon 1059 lays down that: 'In those re-
gions where, according to Civil Law, legal relationship arising 
from adoption renders marriage unlawful, marriage is unlawful also 
according to Canon Law'. Canon 1080 . similarly states: 'Persons 
who by Civil Law are held incapable of contracting marriage bet-
ween themselves because of legal relationship arising from adop-
tion, cannot validly contract marriage between themselves accord-
ing to Canon Law'. 
The existence or otherwise of a prohibitive or diriment impedi-
ment of legal relationship arising from adoption, therefore, is made 
to depend by Canon Law and for Canon Law on the particula_r{;~1;'~' 
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State's decision to make marriages between its members affected 
by this relationship unlawful or even altogether invalid. While mak-
ing no such provision when dealing with Marriage, our Civil Code 
might have something to say about the matter when speaking of the 
effects of Adoption. 
4. EFFECTS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIP ACCOilDING TO MALTA'S ADOP-
TION LAW. 
While nothing in the sections of our Civil Code dealing with 
adoption (sec. 131 to 153) prior to 1962 even remotely implied the 
existence of any legal obstacle to marriages between the adopter 
and the person adopted by him or her, some generic expressions of 
the Adoption Act, 1962, may easily lead one to assume that such 
marriages would in Malta be not simply unlawful but even altoge-
ther invalid. 
The key paragraph of the 1962 Adoption Act is that contained in 
section 138(a) of our Civil Code 1 which states: 'Upon an adoption 
decree being made (a) the person in respect of whom the adoption 
decree is made shall be considered with regard to the rights and 
obligations of relatives in relation to each other, as the child of 
the adopter or adopters born to him, her or them in lawful wedlock 
and as the child of no other person or persons, relationship being 
traced through the adopter or adopters ••. ' 
These generic words of the Adoption Act, 1962 and of our Civil 
Code can be taken to mean that between the person or persons 
adopting and the adopted person there arises a diriment impedi-
ment to marriage depriving them of the capability of marrying bet-
ween themselves. For if, once adoption has taken place according 
to the law, the adopted person acquires the same 'rights and obli-
gations of relatives in relation to each other' as though he were 
the adopters' child born to them in lawful wedlock, it would seem 
that he would also contract any limitation of rights such as impe-
diments to marriage under which relatives within certain degrees 
of kinship labour. Now in Canon Law, which is accepted by the 
juridical order of our State as applicable to all Catholics domicil-
ed in Malta, there exists the diriment impediment of consanguinity 
to marriages between blood-relations within certain degrees of kin-
ship: it would therefore follow that between the adopted and the 
1 In this article we shall be quoting the Civil Code as amended up to the 
31st. December 1967 unless otherwise indicated. 
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latter's relatives there arises also the diriment impediment of legal 
relationship. 
This interpretation of section 138 of our Civil Code seems to be 
suggested by the generic wording of the law as well as by the fact 
that the Adoption Act of 1962 seems set on placing on a par to all 
intents and purposes the adopted child with the child born in law-
ful wedlock. One might also see a requirement of decency, to ob-
viate as much as possible dangers of excessive and unlawful 'fa-
miliarity' between the adopter and the adopted, a requirement pa-
rallel to that existing between in-laws which is adduced to justify 
the impediment of affinity. Such a requirement to exclude the pos-
sibility of the creation of marital relations between the adopted 
and the adopter could be deemed to have been strong enough to in-
duce our legislators to create the impediment of legal relationship 
between the adopter and adopted by depriving them by law of the 
capability of marrying between themselves, just as the legislators 
of some other countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain 
and several Latin American countries have felt it necessary or 
convenient to do. 
5. ANOTHER INTERPRETATION. 
It seems to me, however, that another interpretation can be given 
to these words of section 138 of our Civil Code, more restrictive 
of their meaning, in such a way that the possibility of marriage 
between adopter and adopted is not excluded. Besides, reasons 
can be brought in favour of the non-existence of an impediment to 
marriage based on the legal relationship arising out of adoption 
which seem to me at least as strong as the reasons that militate 
in favour of the existence of such an impediment in Ma~ta. 
This second, more restrictive, interpretation of the words of 
section 138 of our revised Civil Code would restrict the 'rights and 
obligations of relatives in relation to each other' to those referring 
to maintenance and education (physical, moral and spiritual) of 
children and to parental authority. In other words they would refer 
to 'mutual rights and duties of Ascendants, Descendants, Brothers 
and Sisters, and certain other Persons related to each other by Af-
finity' that are the subject-matter of sub-title II of Title I of the 
first book of our Civil Code (sections 14 to 41), as well as to 
those rights and duties which are governed by Title IV of the same 
book ('Parental Authority', sections 154 to 184). This interpreta-
tion would certainly not allow the expression of section 138 to be 
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taken to mean the creation of a diriment impediment to marriage 
between adopter and adopted. 
If this interpretation were to seem excessively and arbitrarily 
restrictive of the expressions of section 138, nevertheless careful 
study of their context would appear to vindicate its validity. For: 
(i) the same subsection (a) cf section 138 goes on to deal with 
the obligations of the wife in cases where the adopters are hus· 
band and wife: it does this by excluding the adopting wife's liabi-
lity to maintain, educate and assign dowry to the adopted child, 
unless the adopting husband is unable to discharge these obliga· 
tions. This seems to show that the section is concerned with rights 
and duties of maintenance and education. 2 This impression is fur-
ther strengthened by the next two sections of our Civil Code. Sec-
tion 139, in fact, deals with orders for payment of maintenance, 
while section 140 deals with property rights between adopter, 
adopted, and the relatives of the adopter. 
(ii) Secondly, by comparing the 1967 amended edition of the Ci-
vil Code with the 1942 edition it becomes evident that section 138 
of the new edition is meant to replace sections 139 to 142 of the 
older law. These sections of the Old Code speak of the 'duties of 
the adopter', of 'assignment of dowry to adopci ve daughter', of the 
'duties of the adoptive mother' and of the 'reciprocal liability for 
maintenance' respectively: all this in terms of rights and duties 
connected with the education and maintenance of the adopted child 
and the latter's duties later in life with respect to the maintenance 
of his adoptive parents. 
2 The same point can be made by examining a prov1s1on in the same sec· 
tion of the 1962 Adoption Act, and consequently in the same subsection 
(a) of section 138 that has been deleted by section 20 of the Civil Code 
(Amendment) (No. 2) Act of 1973 as no longer necessary after the reforms 
in the rights of women introduced by this latter Act. This deleted provi-
sion laid down that, in the case of an adoption decree made in favour of 
a woman who was the sole adopter of a minor, the Court should appoint 
her by the same decree tutrix of the adopted child, and that the provisions 
of section 169 of the Civil Code (now also amended), dealing with the 
usufruct of a widowed mother, who has not remarried, on the property of 
the children during their minority, would apply to her so long as she did 
not marry or remarry. This clause in the original Adoption Act of 1962, in 
fact, once again demonstrates that the 'rights and obligations' for which 
the legislator was making provision in these sections referred to guard· 
ianship, maintenance, education and property rights. 
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(iii) Thirdly, subsection (b) of section 138 states that: 'the rela-
tives of the person in respect of whom the adoption decree is made 
shall lose all rights and be freed from all obligations with respect 
to such person'; that is, co the adopted child. The law is evidently 
still referring co the same 'rights and obligations of relatives in 
relation co each ocher' of subsection (a) whose precise meaning is 
of such great interest to us for the purpose of this article. Now if 
we were to admit that this expression in subsection (a) includes al-
so a referen~e to the existence of an impediment of legal relation-
ship arising out of adoption co a marriage between adopter .and 
adopted, based on the impediment of consanguinity existing bet-
ween the child and his natural relatives, we cannot logically ex-
clude the impediment of consanguini cy from among the 'rights and 
obligations' that are legally dissolved between the adopted child 
and his natural relatives in subsection (b). This would lead us co 
conclude that, as far as ic lies within ics power, our Civil Law 
here meant co remove the matrimonial dirimenc impediment of con-
sanguinity between che adopted child and his natural relatives -
something which our Civil Code evidently had no intention of do-
ing. Conversely, it would seem chat our legislators had no inten-
tion of creating a new impediment to marriage, chat of legal rela-
tionship arising out of adoption, between adopters and adopted. 
Independently of the context of section 138, there seems to be 
quite a few extrinsic reasons which also postulate and tend to con-
firm a more rescricci ve interpretation of the key words of section 
138 ('the rights and obligations of relatives in relation to each 
ocher') chat would in no way demand the existence of a diriment im-
pediment co marriage between an adopter and che adopted. One can 
summarize these reasons as follows: 
(i) If the words of section 138 (a) are taken co include also the 
creation of a diriment impediment of legal relationship arising out 
of adoption, the adopted child would be incapable of contracting 
valid marriage not only with his or her adopters but with a whole 
series of persons re laced co the adopters by consanguinity. 3 For, 
being 'considered with regard co the rights and obligations of rela-
tives in relation co each ocher, as the child of the adopter or 
adopters born co him, her or chem in lawful wedlock and as the 
child of no ocher persons or person, relationship being traced 
through the adopter or adopters •.• ', the adopted child would thus, 
3 That is, by natural generation from a close common ancestor. 
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even for reasons of marriage and of capability of contracting mar-
riage, have to be considered as though he or she were the natural 
son or daughter of the adopters not only as regards his or her 
adopters but also as regards the relatives, by consanguinity, of 
the adopters. This would mean that the adopted child would be in-
capable of contracting marriage with all ascendants of the adopters 
and with all blood-relations of the adopters in the natural collater-
al line of consanguinity to the third canonical degree, calculating 
these degrees by considering the adopted child as though he or she 
were the natural child of the adopters. 4 This line of reasoning 
could even be carried a step further by postulating, logically, that 
such a diriment impedi.ment would arise al so between the adopted 
child and other adopted children within the degrees in which mar-
riage is prohibited because of consanguinity. No legal order that I 
know of postulates the existence of an impediment to marriage of 
legal relationship arising out of legal adoption th,at goes so far 
since, if they admit such an impediment, they generally limit the 
effect of the impediment to invalidate or prohibit marriage merely 
between adopters and adopted. 
(ii) Our legislators, in drawing up the Adoption Act of 1962 had 
not only our past legislation on adoption to which they could refer, 
but also the English Adoption Acts of 1950 and 1958, which expli-
citly and clearly laid down a diriment impediment (of legal relation-
ship) to the marriage of the adopter with his or her legally adopted 
child. 5 Had our legislators wanted to create a similar marriage im-
pediment for Malta, they could easily have made special provision 
for it on the lines of these Acts. 
4 This would exclude ail 'adopted' brothers/ sisters; uncles/ aunts; great-
uncles/ aunts; nephews/ nieces; first and second cousins. 
5 Section 10, subsection (3) of the Adoption Act, 1950 lays down: 'For 
the purpose of the law relating to marriage, an adopter and the person 
whom he has been authorised to adopt under an adoption order are deem-
ed to be within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity notwithstanding 
that by a subsequent order some other person is authorised to adopt the 
same infant.' And the 'Adoption Act, 1958, section 13, subsection (3), re-
peats: 'For the purpose of the law relating to marriage, an adopter and 
the person whom he has been authorised to adopt under an adoption order 
shall be deemed to be within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity; and 
the provisions of this subsection shall continue to have e{fect notwith-
standing that some person other than the adopter is authorised by a sub-
sequent order to adopt the same infant.' 
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(iii) The English Adoption of Children Act of 1926, in section 5 
which deals with the •Effect of adoption order' subsection ( 1), 
contains expressions which closely resemble those of section 138 
of our Civil Code, but which are clearly restricted to rights and 
duties connected with the 'custody, maintenance and education of 
the adopted child'. 6 None of these or any ocher similar expressions 
of the English Ace, 1926, were taken to mean the creation of a di-
riment impediment co marriage between adopter and adopted in Eng-
lish law: so much so chat when, in 1950, the new Adoption Ace 
created chis impediment between adopter and adopted even if the 
adoption order had been made under the Adoption of Children Act, 
1926, it nevertheless cook pains to point out that marriages celeb-
rated before the first day of January, 1950 would not be rendered 
null, presumably since the impediment started to exist only under 
the Adoption Act of 1950. 7 Therefore, even though, in English Law 
the impediment of consanguinity had existed for cen curies, expres-
sions similar to those of our present legislation about the effects 
of an Adoption Order that were contained in the English Adoption 
of Children Act, 1926, were never interpreted as creating an impe-
diment to marriage, like chat of consanguini ry, but based on the le-
gal relationship arising out of legal adoption. 
6. CONCLUSION. 
There are, therefore, strong reasons in favour of interpreting the 
6 'Upon an adoption order being made, all rights, duties, obligations and 
liabilities of the parent or parents, guardian or guardians of the adopted 
child, in relation to the future custody maintenance and education of the 
adopted child, including all rights to appoint a guardian or to consent or 
give notice of dissent co marriage shall be extinguished,• and all such 
rights, duties, obligations and liabilities shall vest in and be exercis-
able by and enforce able against the adopter as though the adopted child 
was a child born to the adopter in lawful wedlock, and in respect of the 
liability of a child co maintain ics parents the adopted child shall stand 
co the adopter exclusiv~ly in the position of a child born co the adopter in 
lawful wedlock: •• .' 
7 Cf. Adoption Ace, 1950, Fifth Schedule, 1: 'Subsection (3) of section ten 
of this Act shall apply in relation co an adoption made under the Adoption 
Ace, 1926, ••• as if it were an adoption order within the meaning of chat 
subsection: 
Pro~ided chat nothing in chis paragraph shall invalidate a marriage so-
lemnised before the first day of January nineteen hundred and fifty.' 
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words 'The rights and obligations of relatives in relation to each 
other' of section 138 of our Civil Code in a way which does not 
imply the creation of a diriment impediment to marriage between 
the adopted on one hand and the adopters and their blood-relations 
on the other. Indeed, it seems to me that these reasons are at 
least as strong as those that militate in favour of the more exten-
sive interpretation of those words that would see in them the intro-
duction of a new diriment impediment to marriage, that of 'Legal 
Relationship' based on legal adoption. 
As a minimum, therefore, I think that one has to admit that there 
is room for prudent doubt as to whether the Civil Law of Malta ac-
cepts the legal relationship arising out of legal adoption between 
the adopted on one hand and the adopter _and the latter's relatives 
on the other as constituting an impediment to marriage. Given that 
the right to marry is a basic natural right of all human beings who 
are not debarred by divine or legitimate human law from contracting 
marriage, this clear fundamental right could not be limited by a 
doubtfully existent law: so much so, that canon 15 of the Code of 
Canon Law lays down that 'in case of doubt in law, laws are not 
binding even if they are invalidating or inhabilitating laws'. In 
fact, it is fair to assume that if our legislators really wanted to 
create such an impediment to marriage, they would have done so 
clearly and unequivocally as their British counterparts did in 1950. 
All in all, therefore, given the doubtful meaning of section 138 of 
our Civil Code, and its complete lack of any other reference to the 
existence of any such impediment of 'Legal Relationship' to mar· 
riage, it would seem that none of the natural rights of adopters or 
their relatives to marry adopted persons have been curtailed by our 
Civil Law. Hence one cannot but conclude that at present in Malta 
the impediment of 'Legal Relationship' to marriage does not exist, 
whether as prohibitive or as diriment, even for Canon Law. It is 
another matter whether this impediment should be introduced by our 
Civil legislators: I prefer, however, to leave it up to them and to 
our sociologists and other competent persons of our community to 
make up their minds on this question. 
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